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SOFT LAW IN SPACE: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
EXTRATERRESTRIAL MINING
ABSTRACT
As technology is rapidly expanding in the field of space exploration and the
prospect of mining on the moon, asteroids, and other celestial bodies looms
nearer, the problems caused by the absence of a legal framework to govern this
type of activity in space are becoming more and more evident. The question
remains open as to whether space resource extraction is permitted under
existing international law, and it is unclear whether governments or private
enterprises may assert property rights over such resources. While spacefaring
nations appear to be reaching a common understanding that space resource
extraction and utilization does not conflict with existing international space
laws, such as the Outer Space Treaty, there is no law explicitly addressing this
issue. The increasingly urgent need for a set of rules detailing the procedures
and safeguards for space resource activities and addressing issues such as
property rights is clear, but the proper forum and format for negotiating these
rules is up for debate.
This Comment demonstrates the need for efficient and inclusive negotiations
on the legal issues surrounding space resource extraction through a proper
international forum. It details several major existing domestic and international
terrestrial mining laws, as well as the current legal framework governing space.
It then analyzes the various approaches to developing a law on space resources
that have been proposed by various nations and scholars, arguing that the
United States should lead negotiations to develop a set of soft law principles for
space resource extraction through an international forum such as the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Next, this Comment suggests
several principles pulled from existing terrestrial mining laws, such as the 1872
Mining Law and the Antarctic Treaty System, that may be applicable to space
resource activities. Finally, this Comment contemplates the various
environmental concerns that may be raised when space resource extraction
comes to fruition.
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INTRODUCTION
For many, the idea of mining the moon likely brings to mind a vision similar
to The Time Machine’s infamous scene depicting the world’s dim future—an
image of the moon shattering and crashing into Earth after humans over-mined
and depleted the moon’s resources to the point of no return.1 This cinematic
portrayal, however, is not as far off from reality as some might think.
Extraterrestrial mining, a concept that once existed only in science fiction, is
now becoming a legitimate pursuit both for governments interested in
maintaining a presence in space2 and for private enterprises looking for the next
big profit-making machine.3 In recent years, major tech companies have taken
interest in the prospect of asteroid mining as space technology has advanced and
scientists have discovered evidence proving that asteroids contain precious
metals in quantities that could be worth trillions of dollars.4 Astrophysicist Neil
deGrasse Tyson has made the grandiose prediction that “[t]he first trillionaire
there will ever be is the person who exploits the natural resources on asteroids.”5
The more recent discovery of water ice on the moon, a resource that can be used
for rocket fuel and would assist in long-term space exploration, has shifted the
moon to the forefront of the field of resource extraction.6
In an effort to fulfill this dream of future riches, the private sector has begun
to dominate the field of space exploration and resource extraction.7 Planetary
1

THE TIME MACHINE (Warner Bros., Dreamworks Pictures 2002).
See Insight–Encouraging the Recovery and Use of Space Resources: Recommendations for
Governmental Policies and Engagement, SECURE WORLD FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2020), https://swfound.org/news/allnews/2020/10/insight-encouraging-the-recovery-and-use-of-space-resources-recommendations-forgovernmental-policies-and-engagement (describing the momentum among spacefaring nations to “formalize
and normalize” space resource utilization).
3
See Andrew Glester, The Asteroid Trillionaires, PHYSICS WORLD, June 2018, at 31, 33 (explaining the
race within the private sector to be the first to mine asteroids for valuable minerals).
4
See id. at 33–34; Andrew Wong, Space Mining Could Become a Real Thing—And It Could Be Worth
Trillions, CNBC (May 15, 2018, 12:39 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/mining-asteroids-could-beworth-trillions-of-dollars.html.
5
Katie Kramer, Build the Economy Here on Earth by Exploring Space: Tyson, CNBC (May 3, 2015,
9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/01/build-the-economy-here-on-earth-by-exploring-space-tyson.html; see
also Glester, supra note 3 (“I’ll make a prediction right now. The first trillionaire will be made in space.” (quoting
Sen. Ted Cruz)).
6
See Kenneth Chang, There’s Water and Ice on the Moon, and in More Places than NASA Thought,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/science/moon-ice-water.html?login=
smartlock&auth=login-smartlock (explaining how water ice found on the moon can be broken down for various
uses by astronauts, including use as rocket propellant to fuel deep space exploration missions).
7
See Glester, supra note 3; Jasper Jolly, US Billionaires Vie to Make Space the Next Business Frontier,
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/feb/06/us-billionairesvie-to-make-space-the-next-business-frontier (“Commercial companies now account for about 80% of the
$424bn global space industry . . . .”).
2
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Resources, founded in 2012, was the first company in the world to announce
plans to engage in a commercial deep space exploration program, with its focus
on exploring asteroids and determining the feasibility of mining them for water
and other resources.8 More recently, companies such as Elon Musk’s SpaceX
and Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin have joined the race to expand civilization into
space and become the first private entity to extract and own space resources.9
Governments are now beginning to depend on these private companies—and the
time and research they have poured into developing space technologies—to
fulfill space policy goals.10 In 2020, for example, SpaceX won the $117 million
“launch contract for NASA’s 2022 mission to explore the mineral-rich asteroid
known as ‘Psyche.’”11
There are several roadblocks hindering the progress of the space resource
industry, however. Most importantly, these missions are both costly and risky—
projects require billions of dollars in funding12 and there is much legal
uncertainty as to the right to extract and own space resources.13 The primary law
governing space exploration is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which prohibits
national appropriation of outer space by claims of sovereignty.14 Whether this
prohibition applies to the recovery and use of space resources has been the
subject of ongoing international debate.15 Spacefaring nations are now
beginning to engage in conversations to update the legal framework to address

8
See Mike Wall, Asteroid Mining Venture Backed by Google Execs, James Cameron Unveiled,
SPACE.COM (Apr. 23, 2012), https://www.space.com/15395-asteroid-mining-planetary-resources.html; Glester,
supra note 3, at 34.
9
See Wong, supra note 4; Jolly, supra note 7. This competition among private players to colonize outer
space, now deemed the “Billionaire Space Race,” has been criticized by many as an expensive and frivolous
display of egos that ignores more pressing problems on Earth, such as climate change. Roxanne Roberts,
Billionaires in Space: The Launch of a Dream or Just Out-of-this-World Ego?, WASH. POST (July 18, 2021, 6:00
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2021/07/18/billionaire-space-race/.
10
Rachael O’Grady, Space Law: Where No One Is Really Sure of the Rules, LAW.COM (June 17, 2020,
3:00 AM), https://www.law.com/international-edition/2020/06/17/space-law-where-no-one-is-really-sure-ofthe-rules/?slreturn=20210802101029.
11
Jonathan Shieber, SpaceX Wins the $117 Million Launch Contract to Explore Psyche’s Heavy Metal
Asteroid, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 28, 2020, 4:57 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/02/28/spacex-wins-the-117million-launch-contract-to-explore-psyches-heavy-metal-asteroid/.
12
See Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, How the Asteroid Mining Bubble Burst, MIT TECH. REV., July–Aug.
2019, at 63, 65 (explaining how several asteroid mining companies collapsed due to a shortfall in funding).
13
See O’Grady, supra note 10.
14
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. II, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
15
See O’Grady, supra note 10; Insight–Encouraging the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, supra
note 2.
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this and other issues that are likely to arise in the future, such as the regulation
of space waste.16
The United States, perhaps unsurprisingly, has taken the lead in moving the
legal and political conversation forward with respect to space resource extraction
and utilization.17 In April of 2020, former President Donald Trump signed
Executive Order 13914, titled “Encouraging International Support for the
Recovery and Use of Space Resources.”18 Executive Order 13914 sets forth the
administration’s intent to engage in commercial exploration and resource
extraction on the moon and other celestial bodies. It also reinforces the United
States’ view that outer space is not a “global commons” and that space resource
use and extraction is not precluded by the Outer Space Treaty.19 This policy is
consistent with those of previous presidents of the United States: in 2015,
President Barack Obama, for example, signed the Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act, which explicitly states that U.S. citizens engaged in the
commercial recovery of space resources have the right to own and use said
resources.20 Shortly after Trump signed Executive Order 13914, NASA
announced the Artemis Accords21—a set of principles intended to encourage
international cooperation and responsibility in future lunar activities, including
resource extraction, through a series of bilateral agreements between the United
States and other spacefaring nations.22
Despite some initial pushback following the announcement of the Artemis
Accords,23 more than a dozen countries have signed them.24 Still, there remains
16
See O’Grady, supra note 10 (describing the unilateral and bilateral approaches being taken by countries
such as the United States, Russia, India, Japan, and Luxembourg).
17
Alex Gilbert, Mining in Space Is Coming, MILKEN INST. REV. (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.
milkenreview.org/articles/mining-in-space-is-coming?IssueID=40.
18
Exec. Order No. 13,914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381 (Apr. 6, 2020).
19
See id.
20
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, § 51303, 129 Stat. 704
(2015).
21
NASA, THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS (2020).
22
Sean Potter & Cheryl Warner, NASA, International Partners Advance Cooperation with First Signings
of Artemis Accords, NASA (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-international-partnersadvance-cooperation-with-first-signings-of-artemis-accords. The Artemis Accords also set forth the goal of
sending the first woman to the moon in 2024. Id.
23
Jason Murdock, Kremlin Says Trump’s Moon-Mining Plans Need ‘Analysis’ as Artemis Accords
Reportedly Set to Initially Shun Russia, NEWSWEEK (May 7, 2020, 7:56 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/
russia-kremlin-artemis-accords-donald-trump-draft-space-moon-mining-proposals-1502528 (quoting Russian
official Dmitry Peskov as saying that “any attempts at ‘privatizing’ outer space . . . would be unacceptable”).
24
The following countries have signed the Artemis Accords as of February 2022: Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Ukraine, the
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disagreement over whether these bilateral agreements are the correct route to
take moving forward.25 In August of 2020, the Canadian Outer Space Institute
issued an open letter signed by space professionals around the world urging the
U.N. General Assembly to begin the formal process for developing a new treaty
addressing space resource utilization and expressing concern over countries
enacting national laws and engaging in bilateral negotiations in the absence of
legal certainty.26 At the same time, countries that have not yet signed the Artemis
Accords, including major space powers China and Russia,27 have begun to
engage in separate conversations with Luxembourg regarding the mutually
beneficial extraction of space resources.28 These countries, which have
historically remained steadfast in their position that the Outer Space Treaty does

United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Israel Becomes 15th Nation to Join Artemis
Accords, SPACENEWS (Jan. 27, 2022), https://spacenews.com/israel-becomes-15th-nation-to-join-artemisaccords/.
25
Insight–Encouraging the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, supra note 2.
26
Letter from The Outer Space Institute to Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, President, United Nations General
Assembly (Aug. 2020), http://www.outerspaceinstitute.ca/docs/InternationalOpenLetterOnSpaceMining.pdf
(“[N]ational approaches risk the development of separate, possibly inconsistent, governance frameworks, while
marginalizing input from developing and non-spacefaring States.”). Canada later signed the Artemis Accords in
October 2020. THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 21.
27
China is prohibited from signing the Artemis Accords due to a 2012 act of Congress banning NASA
from entering into bilateral agreements with China. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
H.R. 2112, 112th Cong. § 539 (2012); see Morgan McFall-Johnsen, China and Russia Haven’t Signed on to
NASA’s New Plan to Unify How Humanity Explores Space, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 13, 2020, 12:52 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/nasa-artemis-accords-deep-space-exploration-moon-mars-asteroids-comets2020-10.
28
Frans von der Dunk, Othmer Professor of L., Univ. of Neb. L., Panel at the University of Nebraska
Space Law Week Conference: Artemis Accords: International Partner and Industry Cooperation and
International Space Norms, at 40:24–40:57 (Oct. 6, 2020) (available at https://mediahub.unl.edu/media/14612).
More recently, China and Russia formally invited international partners to join their International Lunar
Research Station (ILRS) project, which promotes long term lunar exploration and resource utilization. Andrew
Jones, China, Russia Open Moon Base Project to International Partners, Early Details Emerge, SPACENEWS
(Apr. 26, 2021), https://spacenews.com/china-russia-open-moon-base-project-to-international-partners-earlydetails-emerge/. This forebodes a further divide among nations with respect to space policy, and countries are
likely to choose between supporting the Artemis Accords or the ILRS based on their political allegiances.
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, The Artemis Accords and Global Lunar Governance, DIPLOMAT (June 7, 2021),
https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/the-artemis-accords-and-global-lunar-governance/.
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not allow for the extraction of space resources,29 are now beginning to change
course out of fear of being left behind.30
While countries appear to be reaching a common understanding that space
resource extraction is permissible,31 many unanswered questions remain as to
how such extraction will proceed. Nations must come to a mutual agreement on
the correct forum and format for updating the legal framework, and must do so
quickly in order to avoid an “every man for himself” situation in space
reminiscent of the 1800s Gold Rush.32 The future of space resource extraction
and use is inevitable, however distant it may be.33 This Comment argues that the
United States should take anticipatory steps now to develop a set of nonbinding
soft law principles for space resource activities through a multilateral forum.
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes the various mining
laws and treaties that exist for terrestrial mining and the current legal framework
that governs space. Part II examines the various forums proposed by the United
States and other countries that may be used in updating the legal framework for
space resource extraction. Part III argues that the United States and other nations
should engage in the development of a set of nonbinding soft law principles that
lay out specific rules for space mining, pulling principles from existing terrestrial
mining laws. Finally, Part IV discusses the policy implications that may result
from the implementation of this recommendation, particularly with respect to
the environment.

29
See Thomas Cheney, Space Generation Advisory Council, Reactions to the U.S. Space Act 2015:
Statements at COPUOS (Apr. 21, 2016), (available at https://www.slideshare.net/thomcheney1991/reactions-tothe-us-space-act-2015-statements-at-copuos) (summarizing several countries’ reactions to the U.S. Space
Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 during the 2016 session of COPUOS); Elliot Ji, Michael B. Cerny &
Raphael J. Piliero, What Does China Think About NASA’s Artemis Accords?, DIPLOMAT (Sept. 17, 2020), https://
thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-does-china-think-about-nasas-artemis-accords/ (describing Chinese media’s
criticism of the Artemis Accords as a violation of the Outer Space Treaty and a “‘preposterous attempt’ to
unilaterally set ground rules for lunar resource exploitation”).
30
Panel at the University of Nebraska Space Law Week Conference, supra note 28, at 44:20–44:44
(remarks by Ken Hodgkins, President, Int’l Space Enter. Consultants).
31
Id. at 41:43–42:34 (remarks by Frans von der Dunk and Ken Hodgkins); Andrew Jones, China to
Launch Space Mining Bot, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 16, 2020), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/aerospace/
satellites/china-to-launch-space-mining-bot (describing a Chinese space resources company’s plans to launch a
space mining robot to test capabilities in extracting extraterrestrial resources).
32
Ezzy Pearson, Space Mining: The New Goldrush, SCI. FOCUS (Dec. 11, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.
sciencefocus.com/space/space-mining-the-new-goldrush/.
33
Alex Gilbert, Mining in Space Is Coming, MILKEN INST. REV. (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.
milkenreview.org/articles/mining-in-space-is-coming?IssueID=40.
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EXISTING LEGAL LANDSCAPE

The terrestrial mining laws in place today in the United States and
internationally, as well as the existing framework of domestic laws and
international treaties that govern outer space, can help give context as to the
types of principles that the United States may use in developing a legal regime
for extraterrestrial mining. In analyzing the international treaties that relate to
mining and property rights on Earth and in space, it is important to note which
of these treaties the United States has signed and its reasoning for rejecting those
that it has not. As for the domestic laws enacted by the United States, the
international reactions to these laws are of particular relevance in predicting the
success of future agreements the United States may propose to other nations with
respect to natural resource extraction in space. This Part reviews the most
relevant of these laws in depth, paying particular attention to the principles that
the United States has been both willing and unwilling to adopt, as well as the
international reception and critiques to domestic litigation enacted by the United
States.
A. Domestic and International Mining Laws
The legal regimes that govern terrestrial mining domestically and
internationally share several common principles that may also apply to resource
extraction in outer space.34 The primary law governing mining in the United
States is the 1872 Mining Law.35 This law is still in place today, though few
changes have been made to it since its enactment and it has been slow to adapt
to modern needs.36 In the international landscape, several areas have been
subject to international mining or territorial claims, such as the deep seabed and
Antarctica.37 These areas are governed by the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea and the Antarctic Treaty System, respectively.38
34
Lauren E. Shaw, Asteroids, the New Western Frontier: Applying Principles of the General Mining Law
of 1872 to Incentive Asteroid Mining, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 121, 154 (2013).
35
General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21–54 (1982)).
36
See Shaw, supra note 34, at 149.
37
Barbara E. Heim, Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral Resources: A Comparison of International
Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 820 (1990).
38
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 136, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. The Antarctic
Treaty System is comprised of the following treaties: the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402
U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into force on June 23, 1961); Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1,
1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, 1080 U.N.T.S. 176 (entered into force on March 11, 1978); Convention on the Conservation
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476 (entered into force on April 7, 1982);
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868 (not in
force); Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (entered into force
on January 14, 1998).

BYRD_2.15.22

2022]

2/16/2022 3:10 PM

SOFT LAW IN SPACE

809

1. The 1872 Mining Law
The General Mining Law of 1872,39 commonly referred to as the 1872
Mining Law,40 was enacted following the California Gold Rush of 1848 and the
resulting mining boom that took over the western United States.41 Before the
enactment of the 1866 Lode Law (the predecessor to the 1872 Mining Law), no
federal law gave miners the explicit legal right to enter federal lands in search
of natural resources.42 Miners developed their own rules and customs to govern
mining claims, primarily adopting a “first in time, first in right” rule that gave
priority to the first miner to stake a claim.43 This principle and other commonlaw property rights for the acquisition and disposition of property served as the
foundation of the 1872 Mining Law,44 which remains the primary law governing
hard-rock mining on U.S. lands today.45
The 1872 Mining Law declared that “all valuable mineral deposits” on
federal lands are “free and open to exploration and purchase,” along with the
lands on which they are found.46 Its purpose was to encourage and incentivize
citizens to explore and develop the minerals on public lands and ultimately to
settle the West, as well as to regulate the competing claims to these lands and
provide for a recording system.47 The 1872 Law allowed miners to “patent,” or
obtain fee simple title to, lands under federal control on which mineral deposits
had been discovered through a process known as the “location” system.48 This
system allowed miners to enter eligible federal lands, search for valuable mineral
deposits, and, once located, remove the minerals without any payment of
royalties to the federal government.49 Upon discovery of a valuable mineral
deposit, miners could file a patent application and obtain fee simple title to both
the surface and mineral rights of the land.50 In 1994, however, Congress
implemented a patent moratorium that remains in place today—therefore, the
strongest claim any person has under the 1872 Mining Law today is an

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21–54 (1982)).
Id.
JAN G. LAITOS, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 469–70 (3d ed. 2019).
Id. at 469.
Shaw, supra note 34, at 143–44; accord LAITOS, supra note 41, at 470.
Shaw, supra note 34, at 143–46.
LAITOS, supra note 41, at 470.
General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91, 91 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21–54

(1982)).
47
48
49
50

Shaw, supra note 34, at 147.
LAITOS, supra note 41, at 470, 472.
Id. at 472; Shaw, supra note 34, at 147–48.
LAITOS, supra note 41, at 472–73, 494.
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unpatented mining claim.51 These claims carry rights such as the exclusive right
of possession of all minerals located within the claim and the right to use the
land’s surface for mining purposes.52
While the 1872 Mining Law was successful in incentivizing private
investment in the extraction of minerals from federal lands without granting
complete sovereignty,53 it has proven difficult to amend,54 leaving us with an
antiquated law that no longer serves the public interest of the twenty-first
century.55 The 1872 Mining Law has drawn much criticism on the basis that the
law contains no environmental provisions and generates very little revenue for
the federal government.56 Environmental protection was not a priority at the time
of the law’s enactment in 1872, and as a result the law has caused extensive
damage to the environment.57 Additionally, the law requires no royalty payment
to the government, leading to concerns that the government is essentially
“giv[ing] away valuable minerals.”58 Proponents of the law, however, argue that
low transaction costs provide the necessary incentive for private enterprises to
invest in the extraction of these minerals.59 If the 1872 Mining Law is applied to
a legal framework for mining in outer space, then both the upsides and the
downfalls of this statute must be taken into account.
2. Mining Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the current
international legal framework governing the exploration and protection of
international waters, including deep-seabed mining.60 While over 150 countries
have ratified the treaty, the United States has refused to ratify it,61 in part due to
UNCLOS’s use of the “common heritage of mankind” principle with respect to
the deep seabed and its resources.62 By declaring the deep seabed the “common
51

Id. at 473, 497.
Id. at 494, 497.
53
Shaw, supra note 34, at 149.
54
While the 1872 Mining Law has not been amended to date, it has been supplemented by statutes such
as the federal Multiple Mineral Use Act of 1954, the Multiple Surface Use Mining Act of 1955, and the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. LAITOS, supra note 41, at 473.
55
Id. at 471.
56
Id.; Shaw, supra note 34, at 149.
57
Shaw, supra note 34, at 150.
58
Id. at 152.
59
Id.
60
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, art. 2.
61
Id. pmbl.; Todd Skauge, Space Mining & Exploration: Facing a Pivotal Moment, 45 J. CORP. L. 815,
820 (2020).
62
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38; see Skauge, supra note 61.
52
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heritage of mankind,” UNCLOS prohibits states from “claim[ing] or
exercis[ing] sovereignty” over or “appropriat[ing]” the deep seabed and its
resources.63 The United Nations chose this language explicitly to avoid
commercial exploitation of the sea and its resources by technologically advanced
nations and to ensure the riches of the sea are shared equitably among states.64
The United States, on the other hand, tends to view natural resources as a
common property right, meaning that resources can be owned as private property
with no obligation to share those resources with other countries.65
As an alternative to signing UNCLOS, the United States instead entered into
multilateral agreements with other nations66 and adopted the Deep Seabed Hard
Minerals Resources Act (DSHMRA) in 1980 to preserve its property interests
in deep-seabed mineral resources.67 DSHMRA establishes a licensing regime
for these mineral resources, with an emphasis on conservation and protection of
the marine environment.68 It also sets forth criteria that the United States
considers necessary to an acceptable international regime.69 These criteria
“include access for U.S. citizens to deep seabed [mineral] resources” and
assurance that any mining activities that U.S. citizens engage in prior to the
signing of any international regime will be allowed to continue.70
UNCLOS established the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to regulate
and control deep-seabed mining activities.71 The ISA consists of three primary
“organs”: the Council, the Assembly, and the Secretariat.72 Each of these bodies
has separate functions.73 The Council is responsible for administering the
regulations for deep-sea mining, the Assembly is responsible for issuing
decisions on the sharing of mining revenues, and the Secretariat carries out
administrative functions.74 The ISA requires entities applying for a mining
63

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, art. 137.
Isabel Feichtner, Mining for Humanity in the Deep Sea and Outer Space: The Role of Small States and
International Law in the Extraterritorial Expansion of Extraction, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 255, 259 (2019).
65
Scot W. Anderson, Korey Christensen & Julia LaManna, The Development of Natural Resources in
Outer Space, 37 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 227, 255 (2019).
66
See, e.g., Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Mining, Aug. 3, 1984, T.I.A.S. 11066,
1409 U.N.T.S. 1985 (providing an agreement between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, and the United States).
67
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401(b)(3) (2000).
68
NOAA OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., DEEP SEABED HARD MINERAL RESOURCES ACT (2021), https://www.gc.
noaa.gov/documents/gcil_dshmra_summary.pdf (providing a helpful summary of the Act).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, arts. 156(1), 157(1).
72
Id. art. 158(1).
73
See id. arts. 160(1)–(2)(n), 162(1)–(2)(z), 166(3)–(4), 169(1).
74
Id. arts. 160(2)(g), 162(2)(o)(ii), 168(2).
64
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permit to pay a $500,000 application fee75 and approves applications on a firstcome, first-served basis.76 Applicants approved for exploration rights are
required to set aside areas for future use by the ISA’s commercial arm, the
Enterprise.77 The Enterprise “act[s] as a partner in joint ventures with licensed
contractors” for the mining of deep-seabed resources78 or may engage in its own
mining operations.79 This allows the ISA to perform what some consider to be
its “fundamental purpose”: to enable the exploitation of the deep seabed “as a
form of economic reserve, the last unclaimed mining territory on the planet.”80
3. The Antarctic Treaty System
International exploration of Antarctica is governed by a series of treaties
called the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS),81 which centers around the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959.82 The Antarctic Treaty was enacted in response to conflicting
views among nations in the 1940s and 1950s as to whether countries had the
right to make territorial claims in Antarctica.83 Some countries claimed
sovereignty rights over parts of the continent they had explored, while others,
including the United States, refused to recognize the legality of these claims but
reserved the right to make similar territorial claims in the future.84 To resolve
this growing conflict, the United States initiated negotiations with eleven other
countries to develop a legal regime to govern future activities in Antarctica.85
The Antarctic Treaty embraced principles such as “international cooperation”
and “freedom of scientific investigation,” and recognized that “it is in the interest
of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used for peaceful
purposes.”86

75

Id. annex III, arts. 3(1), 13(2).
Id. art. 6(3).
77
Id. art. 8.
78
Anderson et al., supra note 65, at 254.
79
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, annex III, art. 9(1).
80
Anderson et al., supra note 65, at 254.
81
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
82
See FABIO TRONCHETTI, THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOON AND OTHER
CELESTIAL BODIES: A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL REGIME 132 (F.G. von der Dunk ed., 2009).
83
See id. at 133.
84
Id. Australia, Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom each claimed
sovereignty over areas of the continent they had explored. Id. Other countries, including Germany and Italy,
refused to recognize these claims and did not consider any country, including themselves, to have the right to
make such claims. Id.
85
See id. at 136. There are now fifty-four parties to the Antarctic Treaty. Parties, SECRETARIAT OF THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY, https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Parties?lang=e (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
86
The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 38, pmbl.
76
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The Antarctic Treaty divides member nations into “consultative” and “nonconsultative” parties.87 Consultative parties are those that have undertaken
“substantial research activity” in Antarctica, and as such, are dominated by
industrialized nations.88 Consultative parties convene annually to “make
consensus-based decisions concerning activities in Antarctica,” whereas nonconsultative parties may attend only as observers and have no decision-making
authority.89 Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty places all claims to territorial
sovereignty in suspension90—therefore, all territorial claims at the time of the
treaty’s enactment in 1959 remain in place, but no new territorial claims may be
asserted as long as the treaty is in force.91 This has allowed for extensive
scientific research and exploration activities by participating nations.92 Other
articles of the treaty prohibit military activities, provide for the freedom of
scientific investigation and the exchange of information, and provide methods
for the peaceful settlement of disputes.93
One issue that the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 did not address is the exploitation
of mineral resources.94 This issue was first addressed in 1988 in the Convention
on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources (Antarctic Mineral
Convention).95 The convention allowed for certain environmental protections
against mineral resource activities, such as environmental impact assessment
procedures and the prohibition of activities that would cause adverse effects or
significant changes to the Antarctic environment.96 However, no state has
ratified this convention, in part due to its lack of incentive for mining operators,
and thus it has never entered into force.97 The law currently governing mineral
resource exploitation is the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty.98 This protocol provides that “[a]ny activity relating to mineral
resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited,”99 effectively

87

See Skauge, supra note 61, at 821.
The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 38, art. IX. There are currently twenty-nine consultative parties.
Parties, supra note 85.
89
Lynn M. Fountain, Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced by the Common
Heritage of Mankind Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1753, 1771 (2003).
90
The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 38, art. IV.
91
TRONCHETTI, supra note 82, at 137–38.
92
Id. at 138.
93
The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 38, arts. II, III & XI.
94
See TRONCHETTI, supra note 82, at 141.
95
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, supra note 38.
96
Id. arts. II(1)(d)–II(3), III, IV(2)–(4).
97
TRONCHETTI, supra note 82, at 159–60.
98
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, supra note 36.
99
Id. art. VII.
88
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preventing commercial mining and exploitation of natural resources in
Antarctica.100
B. Laws and Treaties Governing Space Exploration
The legal framework governing international activity in space is dominated
by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.101 While other international agreements have
been proposed, such as the 1979 Moon Agreement,102 none have garnered such
widespread international support as the Outer Space Treaty—it remains the only
space-related treaty onto which most of the world’s countries have signed.103
Therefore, all future international agreements and domestic legislation should
comply with the Outer Space Treaty. In response to the scarce legal landscape
relating to the extraction and use of space resources, countries such as the United
States and Luxembourg have enacted unilateral domestic legislation in an effort
to assert property rights over space resources.104
1. Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 is universally understood to be the
foundation of international space law.105 Over 100 countries, including the
United States, have ratified the Outer Space Treaty.106 Adopted in the midst of
the Cold War, its purpose was to avoid potential conflict among spacefaring
nations and to implement procedures for the exploration, research, and
exploitation of resources in space.107 The Outer Space Treaty is based on the res
communis theory—the idea that all nations have equal access to the resources of
outer space and therefore no individual or entity may make any claims of
ownership.108 The treaty states that the exploration and use of outer space “shall
100

TRONCHETTI, supra note 82, at 158.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 14.
102
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979,
1363 U.N.T.S. 22.
103
Priyank D. Doshi, Regulating the Final Frontier: Asteroid Mining and the Need for a New Regulatory
Regime, 6 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 189, 204 (2016).
104
See, e.g., U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, §§ 113, 51303,
129 Stat. 704 (2015); Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace [Law of
July 20th 2017 On The Exploration and Use of Space Resources], art. 1–2, LUX. SPACE AGENCY (Fr.).
105
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 14; Anderson et al., supra note 65, at 237.
106
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5181.
htm#signatory (last visited February 2, 2022).
107
Skauge, supra note 61, at 818.
108
Doshi, supra note 103, at 203.
101

BYRD_2.15.22

2022]

2/16/2022 3:10 PM

SOFT LAW IN SPACE

815

be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries . . . and shall be
the province of all mankind.”109 This language prevents spacefaring nations
from staking claims in outer space so that developing nations may reserve a
future right to space exploration.110
Whether the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the extraction and utilization of
space resources has been the subject of extensive international debate—
countries such as China and Russia have traditionally maintained that resource
extraction and ownership conflicts with the Outer Space Treaty,111 while the
United States and Luxembourg have enacted legislation explicitly authorizing
such activities.112 While the Outer Space Treaty does not specifically address
space resource mining, it contains several principles that are relevant to the
debate.113 Article II declares that outer space “is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty.”114 While this language prohibits claims
of ownership by nations, it does not mention whether this applies to private
entities or individuals.115 Several countries, including the United States, have
recognized this language as a loophole that could justify future commercial
extraction and ownership of resources in outer space.116 The U.S. State
Department has also maintained that this Article II language only prohibits
ownership of space resources that are “in place”—meaning governments and
private entities may assert ownership over these resources once they have been
extracted and removed from the celestial body itself.117 Additionally, some
scholars argue that because the treaty uses the terms “exploration and use,”118

109
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 14, art. I.
110
Doshi, supra note 103.
111
See Ji et al., supra note 29; Cheney, supra note 29.
112
See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, § 51303, 129 Stat. 704
(2015); SENJUTY MALLICK & RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN, IF SPACE IS ‘THE PROVINCE OF MANKIND,’
WHO OWNS ITS RESOURCES? AN EXAMINATION OF THE POTENTIAL OF SPACE MINING AND ITS LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS 11 (2019).
113
See Anderson et al., supra note 65, at 238–41.
114
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 14.
115
See Doshi, supra note 103.
116
See id.; Law of July 20th 2017 On The Exploration and Use of Space Resources, supra note 104, art.
7(2).
117
See Brian J. Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at Galloway Symposium on Critical
Issues in Space Law: The Next Fifty Years of the Outer Space Treaty (Dec. 7, 2016) (available at https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264963.htm) (explaining the U.S. position on space resource extraction
dating back several decades). This view raises complicated questions as to how property rights over resources
can be realistically separated from the celestial body itself. See Anderson, supra note 65, at 239.
118
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 14, arts. I, III.
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the use of space resources was contemplated by the drafters and is therefore not
prohibited.119
Throughout international debates over the correct interpretation of the Outer
Space Treaty’s language, the United States has maintained that the treaty allows
for the commercial mining and use of space resources.120 The United States’
position is reinforced in Executive Order 13914, which states that the United
States’ policy is “to encourage international support for the public and private
recovery and use of resources in outer space.”121 This view has also been backed
by the International Institute of Space Law (IISL), an independent,
nongovernmental organization of space law professionals from around the
world.122 The IISL takes the position that because the Outer Space Treaty
contains no explicit provision prohibiting the use of space resources, the treaty
may be interpreted as permitting the extraction and use of such resources.123 The
IISL does note, however, that there is no consensus as to whether “the right of
‘free use’ includes the right to take and consume non-renewable natural
resources.”124 This Comment proceeds on the assumption that the extraction and
use of outer space resources is not precluded by the Outer Space Treaty, while
noting much legal uncertainty remains as to space mining procedures.
2. The Moon Agreement
The Moon Agreement of 1979 was enacted to address the issue of resource
utilization on the moon and other debated issues facing the newly developing
space industry.125 It has been ratified by only eighteen countries and has never
been ratified by China, Russia, or the United States.126 As such, the agreement
119

See Anderson, supra note 65, at 239.
See id.
121
Exec. Order No. 13,914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381 (Apr. 6, 2020).
122
Introduction, INT’L INST. OF SPACE L., https://iislweb.space/introduction/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
The IISL is an official observer of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and its
Legal Subcommittee, and it produces regular reports on its activities. Id. Its purpose is “to promote the further
development of space law and the expansion of the rule of law in the exploration and use of outer space for
peaceful purposes.” Id.
123
INT’L INST. OF SPACE L., POSITION PAPER ON SPACE RESOURCE MINING 3 (2015),
https://iislweb.space/iisl-position-paper-on-space-resource-mining/. The IISL points out that Article I of the
Outer Space Treaty provides for undiscriminating free exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies.
Id. at 2.
124
Id.
125
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 102,
arts. II(1)–(3), (5); see Doshi, supra note 103, at 206.
126
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXIV-2&chapter=24&
clang=_en (last visited Feb. 2, 2022) (listing signatories).
120
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is viewed by many as a failed instrument of international law and considered
obsolete.127 This is in large part due to the fact that the agreement closed the
loophole in the Outer Space Treaty that these nations had been using to justify
the exploitation of space resources by explicitly prohibiting private entities and
individuals from owning the moon’s resources.128 Article 11 of the Moon
Agreement states that the moon and its resources are “the common heritage of
mankind” and dictates that “neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon,
nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any
State, international intergovernmental or nongovernmental organization,
national organization or nongovernmental entity or of any natural person.”129
The United States has consistently hesitated to sign international treaties that
apply the common heritage principle to govern natural resource mining, as
shown by the United States’ failure to ratify UNCLOS.130
While the Moon Agreement ultimately did not gain enough traction to give
it much force in the international space law regime, it contains some provisions
that may be relevant to the United States’ development of future space mining
laws. One provision that the major spacefaring nations did agree on was the
Article 11 directive to establish an international space regime and procedures
“to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon.”131 While this
provision alone is not enough to overcome the less agreeable aspects of the
agreement, it reflects the international consensus that a regulatory body for the
exploitation of space resources must be developed while balancing the interests
of developing nations with those of the more powerful spacefaring nations.132
Additionally, the use of language prohibiting the ownership of moon resources
“in place”133 is consistent with the United States’ aforementioned position that
ownership is permitted once resources have been extracted and removed from
the celestial body.134
127
Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: Failed International Law or Waiting in the Shadows?, SPACE REV.
(Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/1954/1.
128
See Doshi, supra note 103, at 206. The goal of the Moon Agreement was to reinforce the idea that outer
space was a universal good and could not be divided and exploited among nations. Id.
129
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 102,
arts. 11(1), (3). Unlike the Outer Space Treaty, this language contemplates the commercial use of space resources
and “provides an additional legal barrier to private ownership.” Doshi, supra note 103, at 206.
130
See supra Part I.A.2.
131
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 102,
art. 11; see Doshi, supra note 103, at 207.
132
See Doshi, supra note 103, at 207.
133
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 102,
art. 11(3).
134
See supra Part I.B.2; Dr. Matthew Stubbs, Space Mining: Commercial Opportunities and Legal
Uncertainties, 42 BULL.: L. SOC’Y S. AUSTL. J. 18, 19 (2020).
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3. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015
In response to the uncertainties surrounding space mining in the international
legal sphere, Congress passed the U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act in 2015.135 Prior to the enactment of this law, the prospect
of asteroid mining had been gaining traction within the private sector,136 and the
need for clarification over the use and possession of space resources became
clear. Title IV, titled the “Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act,”
specifically addresses property rights over space resources.137 It guarantees the
following:
[A] United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an
asteroid resource or a space resource . . . shall be entitled to any
asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess,
own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource
obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the international
obligations of the United States.138

It also contains a disclaimer that “by the enactment of this Act, the United States
does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or
jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.”139
Whether the Space Law Competitiveness Act complies with the United
States’ obligations under the Outer Space Treaty has been a point of international
contention.140 The answer to this question largely depends on whether the Outer
Space Treaty’s prohibition on “national appropriation” of celestial bodies
extends to ownership of their extracted resources.141 As noted above, the
International Institute of Space Law took the position that, because there is no
explicit provision in the Outer Space Treaty prohibiting the ownership and use
of space resources, such ownership is permitted, and the Space Law
Competitiveness Act is therefore in compliance.142 The Institute did note,
however, that the future understanding and development of the nonappropriation principle depends primarily on whether other nations interpret the
135

U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
See Doshi, supra note 103, at 191–93 (discussing mining among the private sector).
137
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act § 51303.
138
Id.
139
Id. § 403. This language necessarily implicates questions concerning property rights over resources
and how the United States will recognize these rights when it cannot claim sovereignty. These questions are
beyond the scope of this Comment.
140
Anderson et al., supra note 65, at 243.
141
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 14, art. II; see Anderson et al., supra note 65, at 243.
142
Int’l Inst. of Space L., supra note 123, at 3; see supra Part I.B.1.
136
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Outer Space Treaty in a manner consistent with the Space Law Competitiveness
Act.143 Luxembourg’s recent adoption of a similar law indicates that the
international consensus on property rights to space resources is moving in the
direction of the U.S. position that the extraction and ownership of such resources
is compliant with the Outer Space Treaty.144 Luxembourg’s law regards space
resources as being appropriable and subject to property rights but reinforces the
idea that the celestial bodies themselves cannot be claimed.145
The international reactions to the United States’ enactment of the Space
Launch Competitiveness Act are indicative of how unilateral acts taken by the
United States to develop space law may be perceived by other major
international powers. The Space Launch Competitiveness Act was presented at
the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 2016.146
COPUOS is one of the largest committees in the U.N. system, consisting of
ninety-five member states, and has traditionally been the primary setting for
multilateral conversations on the use of space resources.147 During the 2016
session of COPUOS, Russia rejected the United States’ unilateral adoption of
the Act, arguing that all space resource laws should be created in COPUOS due
to the risks posed by space mining.148 Russia took the view that space resources
are equivalent to celestial bodies and thus prohibited from appropriation under
the Outer Space Treaty.149 Belgium also opposed the U.S. act, stating that an
international approach to developing a space mining law regime was needed
rather than the ad hoc enactment of national legislation.150 Belgium argued that
space resources cannot be appropriated by extension of national jurisdiction.151
Despite Belgium and Russia’s past insistence that the Outer Space Treaty
prohibits the appropriation of space resources,152 it is important to consider
143

Int’l Inst. of Space L., supra note 123, at 3.
Law of July 20th 2017 On The Exploration and Use of Space Resources, supra note 104, art. 1; see
Anderson, supra note 65, at 246.
145
Law of July 20th 2017 On The Exploration and Use of Space Resources, supra note 104, art. 2(4);
MALLICK & RAJAGOPALAN, supra note 112.
146
G.A. Res. 71/90, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Dec. 22, 2016).
147
Ian A. Christensen & Christopher D. Johnson, Putting the White House Executive Order on Space
Resources in an International Context, SPACE REV. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/
3932/1.
148
Cheney, supra note 29.
149
Id. Russia’s position on the issue has since changed, with the country now joining forces with China to
build a new lunar space station with the intention of extracting and utilizing resources on the moon. Andrew E.
Kramer & Steven Lee Meyers, Russia, Once a Space Superpower, Turns to China for Missions, N.Y. TIMES
(June 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/world/asia/china-russia-space.html.
150
Cheney, supra note 29.
151
Id.
152
Id.
144
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whether these countries truly opposed the extraction and ownership of space
resources or whether they merely opposed the United States’ unilateral decision
that U.S. citizens may commercially extract and own space resources. In 2019,
Russia began negotiations with Luxembourg to develop a framework agreement
for cooperation between the two countries in space mining activities.153 The
following year, however, Russia’s space agency, Rocosmos, responded to
President Trump’s Executive Order 13914154 by characterizing it as an
“[a]ttempt[] to expropriate outer space and aggressive plans to actually seize
territories of other planets.”155 Russia has not yet signed the U.S. Artemis
Accords.156 These conflicting actions indicate that major space powers such as
Russia are open to negotiating a new legal framework that specifically addresses
extraterrestrial mining and allows for the extraction and utilization of resources,
but will only do so in a manner that is acceptable to them. Bold, unilateral moves
from the United States, such as the Space Launch Competitiveness Act and
Executive Order 13914, are typically seen as aggressive power grabs.157 If the
United States hopes to achieve cooperation from other nations in its goals to
extract resources in space, it must consider the role that the battle for
hegemony—on Earth and in space—plays in the context of international
negotiations.
II. PROPOSALS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MINING LAWS IN SPACE
While nations continue to debate the right to own and extract minerals in
space, one point of international consensus has prevailed: a legal model to
govern the exploration and extraction of these resources must be agreed upon to
maintain the peaceful use of outer space and avoid an unregulated “free for all”
in space.158 Governments and scholars disagree, however, on the appropriate
route to take in developing this new legal regime.159 Following the 2016 session
153
Vladimir Soldatkin, Russia Wants to Join Luxembourg in Space Mining, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2019, 9:06
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-luxembourg-russia-space/russia-wants-to-join-luxembourg-in-spacemining-idUSKCN1QN1OQ.
154
Exec. Order No. 13,914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381 (Apr. 6, 2020).
155
Adam Smith, Russia Says Trump’s Space Mining Order Is an Attempt to ‘Seize’ Other Planets, PC
MAG. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.pcmag.com/news/russia-says-trumps-space-mining-order-is-an-attempt-toseize-other-planets#:~:text=News-,Russia%20Says%20Trump’s%20Space%20Mining%20Order,Attempt%
20to%20’Seize’%20Other%20Planets&text=It’s%20called%20the%201979%20’Moon,Space%20Agency%2
C%20have%20ratified%20it.
156
Potter & Warner, supra note 22.
157
Smith, supra note 155.
158
Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147; see Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Annotated
Agenda on its Fifty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.312 (2020), https://www.unoosa.org/res/
oosadoc/data/documents/2020/aac_105c_2l/aac_105c_2l_312_0_html/V2001359.pdf.
159
See Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
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of COPUOS, in which the discussion on the U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act took place,160 the exchange of views between nations on
the development of such a model has become an increasingly popular agenda
item.161 Since the Moon Agreement in 1979, however, “no new internationally
binding legal instruments have been developed [through] COPUOS.”162
Member nations of COPUOS have begun to accept that a different approach to
international agreement, as opposed to developing a binding treaty, may be more
appropriate given the immediacy of this issue and the arduous and lengthy
process involved in treaty-making.163 This Part examines the various approaches
proposed by the United States and other countries, analyzes the likelihood of
success for each of these approaches in the context of the United States’ and
other countries’ willingness to sign such an agreement, and recommends that the
United States proceed with a soft law approach.
A. The Artemis Accords: The U.S. Approach
On May 15, 2020, NASA presented the Artemis Accords—the set of
principles through which the United States intends to lead the development of
international law on space exploration and resource extraction by entering into
bilateral agreements with other nations.164 The purpose of the Artemis Accords
is to encourage “the international community to reach a consensus on the legality
of space resource [extraction],” as well as persuade other nations to participate
in the Artemis Program and future space resource activities.165 The development
of the Artemis Program and the Artemis Accords is part of the goal set forth in
Executive Order 13914 “to encourage international support for the public and
private recovery and use of resources in outer space” and “negotiate joint
statements and bilateral and multilateral arrangements with foreign states
regarding safe and sustainable operations for the public and private recovery and
use of space resources.”166
160

See supra Part I.B.3.
Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147; see Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Annotated
Agenda on its Fifty-Ninth Session, supra note 158 (listing the “[g]eneral exchange of views on potential legal
models for activities in exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources” as an agenda item).
162
Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
163
Id. These approaches include bilateral agreements between two countries, mini-lateral agreements
between multiple countries, and domestic legislation such as the laws adopted by the United States and
Luxembourg. Id.
164
The Artemis Accords: Principles for a Safe, Peaceful, and Prosperous Future, NASA, https://www.
nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2022); see Gouyu Wang, NASA’s Artemis
Accords: The Path to a United Space Law or a Divided One?, SPACE REV. (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.
thespacereview.com/article/4009/1.
165
Wang, supra note 164.
166
Exec. Order No. 13,914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381 (Apr. 6, 2020).
161
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The Artemis Accords include such principles as “peaceful purposes,”167
“transparency,”168 “space resources,”169 and “deconfliction of activities,”170
emphasizing international cooperation and adherence to the Outer Space Treaty
while also encouraging participation in space resource activities.171 With respect
to the extraction of space resources, the text of the Accords states that “the
extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national
appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.”172 NASA
representatives have repeatedly stated that the Accords represent the “common
ground” that countries can extract and own space resources under the Outer
Space Treaty and “enjoy the fruits of [their] labor.”173 Beyond this, however,
property rights to space resources are not specifically addressed.
The Artemis Accords are consistent with an “America first” attitude, the
traditional U.S. approach to space exploration.174 However, this approach has its
downsides, especially in the context of the extraction of space resources—a
concept that is newly developing and upon which not all nations agree.175 While
the Accords emphasize international cooperation, they could very well have the
opposite effect.176 Competition among nations has historically fueled innovation
and technological advances in the space industry, beginning with the race to put
the first man on the moon in the 1960s.177 The Artemis Accords could lead to a
revival of this space race, creating a new competition among space powers to
control space resources and lead the technological advancement of human
167
The Artemis Accords, supra note 164 (“[A]t the core of the Artemis Accords is the requirement that all
activities will be conducted for peaceful purposes, per the tenets of the Outer Space Treaty.”).
168
Id.
169
Id. (“The ability to extract and utilize resources on the Moon, Mars, and asteroids will be critical to
support safe and sustainable space exploration and development. The Artemis Accords reinforce that space
resource extraction and utilization can and will be conducted under the auspices of the Outer Space Treaty, with
specific emphasis on Articles II, VI, and XI.”).
170
Id. (“NASA and partner nations will provide public information regarding the location and general
nature of operations which will inform the scale and scope of ‘Safety Zones.’ Notification and coordination
between partner nations to respect such safety zones will prevent harmful interference, implementing Article IX
of the Outer Space Treaty and reinforcing the principle of due regard.”). Other principles include
“interoperability,” “emergency assistance,” “registration of space objects,” “release of scientific data,” and
“orbital debris and spacecraft disposal.” Id.
171
Id.; see Wang, supra note 164.
172
THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 21, § 10(2).
173
Panel at the University of Nebraska Space Law Week Conference, supra note 28, at 9:14–9:22, 44:46–
44:57 (remarks of Mike Gold, Acting Assoc. Adm’r, Off. of Int’l and Interagency Affs.).
174
See Wang, supra note 164 (“[I]n terms of overall objective, the Accords intend to create a favorable
international environment for space resources exploitation and utilization led by the United States . . . .”);
Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
175
See Wang, supra note 164.
176
See id.
177
See id.
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activity in space.178 While such competition can be beneficial in promoting rapid
technological advances in the space industry, the line separating space from
becoming a healthy competitive environment or a cosmic battleground is thin.
To avoid the latter, nations must be united around clear, negotiated standards for
space resource activities—standards which the Artemis Accords do not provide.
The international response to similar action by the United States was seen in the
context of the Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015.179 Countries such as
Belgium and Russia refused to accept the unilateral decision by the United
States, emphasizing that this type of decision should be reached by consensus
through the forum of COPUOS.180
Other nations have also criticized the Artemis Accords on the basis that they
are bilateral rather than multilateral: each country that signs onto the Accords
will be bound to a separate agreement with the United States.181 This raises the
danger of fragmentation and divergence—the risk that one bilateral agreement
will be implemented differently from another and that the United States may
show favoritism towards certain nations.182 In response to this concern, NASA
has emphasized that while the agreements themselves are bilateral, the
implementation will be done on a multilateral level.183 Each country will be
agreeing to the same principles under the Accords, which NASA argues are
designed to encourage universal compliance with the Outer Space Treaty.184
However, there is currently no mechanism in place to ensure that the agreements
are implemented consistently. Despite NASA’s insistence that the Artemis
Accords prioritize inclusivity,185 many of the countries that have signed the
Accords thus far are major powers with an existing presence in space.186
178

See id.
See supra Part I.B.3.
180
See Cheney, supra note 29 (summarizing Belgium and Russia’s reactions to the U.S. Space Launch
Competitiveness Act of 2015 during the 2016 session of COPUOS).
181
See Panel at the University of Nebraska Space Law Week Conference, supra note 28, at 10:41–11:07
(remarks by Mike Gold, Acting Assoc. Adm’r, Off. of Int’l and Interagency Affs.).
182
See id. at 20:01–21:06 (remarks by Frank von der Dunk, Othmer Professor of L., Univ. of Neb. L).
183
See id. at 24:52–25:39 (remarks by Frank von der Dunk, Othmer Professor of L., Univ. of Neb. L. &
Matthew Schaefer, Founding Co-Dir., Space, Cyber, and Telecomms. L. Program).
184
See id. at 4:52–11:13 (remarks by Mike Gold, Acting Assoc. Adm’r, Off. of Int’l and Interagency
Affs.).
185
Id.
186
THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 21. Countries that have signed the Artemis Accords include
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, the Republic of
Korea, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Israel Becomes 15th
Nation to Join Artemis Accords, supra note 24. Canada, Israel Japan, Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea, the
United Kingdom, and the United States each have an existing space program. Countries with Space Programs
2022, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-with-spaceprograms (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
179
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Ultimately, while NASA’s intent behind the Artemis Accords may be to “unify
the world,”187 bilateral agreements may not be the correct format in which to
achieve this.
Another concern is the role that the private sector will play in the Artemis
Accords.188 Many technology companies have ambitions to travel to the moon
and Mars for their own purposes, but to do so they will have to buy into the
overall vision of the Accords.189 However, private companies may view certain
principles in the Accords, such as interoperability and the release of scientific
data, as an impediment to innovation.190 For space resource extraction to be
successful, the government and the private sector must work together to form a
common understanding of how their separate goals will be achieved.191 NASA
representative Mike Gold stated that “there is no seat at [COPUOS] for the
private sector.”192 Moving forward, there must be some forum for input from the
private sector in the legal framework that is being developed.193
B. The U.N. Multilateral Treaty Process
On the other end of the spectrum are those countries and organizations
advocating for a new multilateral treaty, formed through the United Nations’
formal treaty-making process.194 In August of 2020, the Canadian Outer Space
Institute issued an open letter to COPUOS urging the committee to begin the
formal treaty-making process by which member nations would negotiate a
multilateral agreement on space resource exploration and utilization.195 The
letter expressed concern regarding the national and bilateral approaches taken
by countries such as the United States, arguing that such approaches “risk the
development of separate, possibly inconsistent, governance frameworks, while

187
Panel at the University of Nebraska Space Law Week Conference, supra note 28, at 47:31–47:43
(remarks by Mike Gold, Acting Assoc. Adm’r, Off. of Int’l and Interagency Affs.).
188
See id. at 25:25–25:47 (remarks by Ken Hodgkins, President, Int’l Space Enter. Consultants).
189
Id. at 26:03–26:15.
190
See id. at 29:51–30:35 (remarks by Matthew Shaefer, Founding Co-Dir., Space, Cyber, and
Telecomms. L. Program).
191
See id. at 25:47–28:41 (remarks by Ken Hodgkins, President, Int’l Space Enter. Consultants & Mike
Gold, Acting Assoc. Adm’r, Off. of Int’l and Interagency Affs.).
192
Id. at 28:55–30:01 (remarks by Mike Gold, Acting Assoc. Adm’r, Off. of Int’l and Interagency Affs.
& Matthew Shaefer, Founding Co-Dir., Space, Cyber, and Telecomms. L. Program). Gold stressed the need to
bring the private and public sectors together to create a likeminded coalition. Id.
193
See id. at 27:02–28:15 (remarks by Ken Hodgkins, President, Int’l Space Enter. Consultants).
194
Alfred B. Anzaldúa & Cristin Finnigan, From the Truman Proclamation to the Artemis Accords: Steps
Toward Establishing a Bottom-Up Framework for Governance in Space, SPACE REV. (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4053/1.
195
Letter from The Outer Space Institute to Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, supra note 26.
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marginalizing input from developing and non-spacefaring States.”196 The letter
also compared outer space to “the high seas, the deep seabed, and Antarctica,”
all of which are “governed [by] specific, multilateral agreements” developed
through the United Nations.197 The letter was signed by more than 140 scientists,
politicians, and diplomats from around the world.198 While Canada has since
signed the Artemis Accords,199 experts continue to advocate for the multilateral
treaty approach.200
Multilateral discussions on space law have traditionally taken place at
COPUOS, particularly within the Legal Subcommittee.201 COPUOS consists of
ninety-five member states202 who meet annually to discuss questions relating to
current and future activities in space.203 Since 2016, the COPUOS agenda has
contained an item titled “General exchange of views on potential legal models
for activities in exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources.”204
The last meeting of the Legal Subcommittee in 2019 focused heavily on
revisiting the Moon Agreement,205 which no major spacefaring power has
ratified to date.206 This discussion may have been the impetus behind President
Trump’s Executive Order 13914, which specifically renounces the Moon
Agreement.207

196

Id.
Id.
198
Steven Chase, Canadian-Led Effort Asking United Nations to Draw Up Global Space Mining Treaty
Attracts Significant Endorsements, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/
article-canadian-led-effort-asking-united-nations-to-draw-up-global-space/.
199
The Canadian Press, Canada Joins U.S.-Led Artemis Accords to Send Human Explorers Back to Moon
and Beyond, CBC (Oct. 14, 2020, 7:12 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/artemis-accords-1.5761456.
200
See O’Grady, supra note 10.
201
Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
202
Members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. COMM. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS.,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/members/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
203
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Subcommittees, U.N. COMM. FOR OUTER SPACE
AFFS., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/comm-subcomms.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
The 2020 session of COPUOS was cancelled due to COVID-19. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space: 2020, U.N. COMM. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/2020/
index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
204
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Annotated Agenda on its Fifty-Ninth Session, supra note
158; Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
205
Legal Subcommittee: 2019, IISL/ECSL Space Law Symposium 2019 “The Moon Agreement Revisited:
The Road Ahead,” U.N. COMM. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/lsc/
2019/symposium.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
206
Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
207
Exec. Order No. 13914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381 (Apr. 6, 2020); see Christensen & Johnson, supra note
147.
197
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The multilateral treaty-making process is appealing for several reasons: a
new international treaty developed through COPUOS “would have widespread
legitimacy,” would provide for clear, binding rules for the extraction of space
resources,208 and would be inclusive and accessible to all ninety-five member
nations.209 However, there are many downsides to the formal treaty-making
process that outweigh its benefits, particularly the lengthy and arduous process
required for members to negotiate, come to an agreement, and sign and ratify
the treaty.210 The last treaty negotiated through COPUOS was the Moon
Agreement, which entered into force in 1984.211 Negotiations began in 1971 and
the treaty was adopted and opened for signature in 1979.212 At the end of this
thirteen-year process, only eighteen nations ratified the Moon Agreement,213 and
today it is widely viewed as a failed, problematic treaty.214 Another example
outside of space law is the development of the International Seabed Authority
within UNCLOS to regulate deep-seabed mining activities.215 The International
Seabed Authority took nearly thirty years to come into force and under it no
commercial mining of the deep seabed has yet taken place.216
Aside from the potentially decades-long process it may take for member
nations of COPUOS to come to an agreement on the appropriate regulations for
space resource activities, multilateral treaties are nearly impossible to amend and
may become quickly outdated or irrelevant due to technological, political, or
economic advances.217 In a rapidly advancing industry such as space
exploration, it would be difficult for such large-scale negotiations to keep up
with changing practices, and implementing binding rules for an activity that has
not yet occurred would appear premature and ill-advised.218 Finally, the formal
treaty-making process leaves out non-state actors like the private sector and
academia219—groups that have proven essential in carrying out the United

208

Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
O’Grady, supra note 10.
210
See Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
211
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 102;
see Space Law Treaties and Principles, U.N. COMM. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/
ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
212
G.A. Res. 34/68., ¶ 2 (Dec. 5, 1979).
213
STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATING TO ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE AS AT 1 JANUARY
2020, at 2 (n.d.), https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/TreatiesStatus-2020E.pdf.
214
Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
215
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, arts. 156–57(1).
216
Anzaldúa & Finnigan, supra note 194.
217
See id.; Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
218
See Insight–Encouraging the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, supra note 2.
219
Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
209

BYRD_2.15.22

2022]

2/16/2022 3:10 PM

SOFT LAW IN SPACE

827

States’ ambitious plans for space exploration.220 Ultimately, it is highly unlikely
that the major space powers will wait for a multilateral treaty to be developed
before proceeding with their own goals for space resource utilization.
C. An Implementation Plan for the Moon Agreement
A less popular solution to the legal grey area surrounding space resources is
an implementation plan for the Moon Agreement.221 As mentioned
previously,222 no major space power has ever ratified the 1979 treaty, and it is
widely viewed as flawed and incomplete.223 One reason for this view is that
Article 11 requires an implementation agreement to create a legal framework for
the private exploitation of space resources on the moon, which was never
created.224 Without this regime in place, there is great uncertainty as to the
viability of commercial activities225 because the Moon Agreement specifically
prohibits the appropriation of resources on the moon.226 One academic
organization, The Space Treaty Institute, which claims to be “dedicated to peace
and sustainability in outer space,”227 has published a Model Implementation
Agreement for the Moon Agreement228 as an alternative to the Artemis
Accords.229 The Model Implementation Agreement centers around four
organizational principles, including a proposal to “[t]rade private property rights
for public policy obligations.”230 The idea behind this model is that private actors

220
O’Grady, supra note 10; see also Shieber, supra note 11 (describing NASA’s award to SpaceX of a
$117 million launch contract “to explore the mineral-rich asteroid known as Psyche”).
221
Dennis O’Brien, The Artemis Accords: Repeating the Mistakes of the Age of Exploration, SPACE REV.
(June 29, 2020), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3975/1.
222
See supra Part II.B.
223
Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
224
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 102,
art. 11(5) (“States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international regime, including
appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is
about to become feasible.”); see O’Brien, supra note 221.
225
O’Brien, supra note 221.
226
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 102,
art. 11(3).
227
The Space Treaty Institute, SPACE TREATY INST. (Oct. 8, 2019), http://spacetreaty.org/.
228
Dennis O’Brien, Legal Support for the Private Sector: An Implementation Agreement for the Moon
Treaty, 3 ADVANCES IN ASTRONAUTICS SCI. & TECH. 49, 61 (2020), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
341522997_Legal_Support_for_the_Private_Sector_An_Implementation_Agreement_for_the_Moon_Treaty.
229
See id.
230
Id. at 50. The complete set of principles are as follows:

1. The Agreement must be comprehensive and support all private activity; 2. The Grand Bargain:
Trade private property rights for public policy obligations; 3. Defer issues currently at impasse
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will use any location on the moon for any purpose in exchange for adherence to
the public policy obligations laid out in the Moon Agreement,231 such as
protecting the environment, preserving areas of “special scientific interest,”232
and allowing “free access to all areas” by other parties.233 The Model
Implementation Agreement is intended to be adopted in conjunction with the
Moon Agreement and to encourage countries to sign onto the Moon Agreement
by filling in the gaps left open by Article 11.234
While the principles and rationale behind the Space Treaty Project’s Model
Implementation Agreement set forth an appropriate balance between public and
private interests, the lack of a legal regime for resource exploitation is not the
only reason the Moon Agreement has been rejected by the United States and
other countries.235 As discussed in Part I.B.2, the United States has refused to
ratify the Moon Agreement because of its use of the “common heritage of
mankind” language236—the same language that prevented the United States
from signing UNCLOS with respect to deep-seabed mining.237 Executive Order
13914 specifically renounces the Moon Agreement, stating that “the Secretary
of State shall object to any attempt by any other state or international
organization to treat the Moon Agreement as reflecting or otherwise expressing
customary international law,”238 while the Artemis Accords contain explicit
language authorizing parties to extract and utilize resources.239 There have even
been suggestions that Australia, one of the only parties to the Moon Agreement
to sign the Artemis Accords, may consider withdrawing from the Moon
Agreement to avoid the legal consequences of potentially violating the
Agreement.240 It is highly unlikely that the United States and other countries
(e.g., monetary sharing of benefits) by creating a governance process for making future decisions;
4. Build upon and integrate current institutions and processes.
Id.
231
232

Id. at 51.
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 102,

art. 7.
233

Id. art. 9(2).
See id. art. 11; O’Brien, supra note 228, at 50.
235
See Doshi, supra note 103, at 206.
236
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 102,
art. 11(1).
237
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, art. 136; see Skauge, supra note 61, at 820.
238
Exec. Order No. 13,914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381 (Apr. 6, 2020).
239
Panel at the University of Nebraska Space Law Week Conference, supra note 28, at 9:14–9:31 (remarks
by Mike Gold, Acting Assoc. Adm’r, Off. of Int’l and Interagency Affs.).
240
See Mark Whittington, How the United States Plans to Make Space Exploration Pay, THE HILL
(Apr. 26, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/494730-how-the-united-states-plans-to-make234
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would abandon the Artemis Accords in favor of revisiting an old treaty they have
already firmly rejected.241
D. The Development of Private Law in Space
Another, more radical legal model that some scholars have proposed is the
development of a body of private law to govern space resource extraction.242
Proponents of this model argue that a body of rules grounded in consensual
practices, rather than sovereign authority, “can lay the foundations for future
space activities, without sparking a governmental scramble to project power.”243
The theory is that private governance will avoid the conflicts that may arise from
“jurisdictional claim-staking” in space and will eliminate the suspicion of
political motives, which has caused countries such as China and Russia to reject
the United States’ current approach.244 These scholars have compared the
commercial space sphere with international commerce: trade between nations is
governed by a private body of self-enforcing law and commercial disputes are
privately adjudicated with the help of international arbitration organizations
such as the International Chamber of Commerce.245 Applied to space, scholars
believe that under this model, private entities will be able to enforce property
rights to space resources without acknowledgement from sovereigns,246 with
governments playing a regulatory role.247
However, giving the private sector free rein in outer space without a set of
predetermined rules or principles in place is not a viable solution in this context.
There are far too many risks and unknown factors involved in space resource
extraction to allow these rules to evolve on their own through commercial
practices.248 For example, there are environmental concerns associated with
commercial space activities, such as the regulation of space debris and the risk

space-exploration-pay (“Australia would be obliged to withdraw from the Moon Treaty if it accepts an offer to
join the Accords.”).
241
Exec. Order No. 13,914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381 (Apr. 6, 2020).
242
Alexander William Salter, Outer Space Needs Private Law, SPACE REV. (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4015/1.
243
See id.; Alexander W. Salter & Peter T. Leeson, Celestial Anarchy: A Threat to Outer Space
Commerce?, 34 CATO J. 581, 583 (2014).
244
See Salter, supra note 242; Salter & Leeson, supra note 243.
245
See Salter, supra note 242.
246
See Salter & Leeson, supra note 243.
247
See Salter, supra note 242.
248
See Samuel Stockwell, Legal ‘Black Holes’ in Outer Space: The Regulation of Private Space
Companies, E-INT’L RELS. (July 20, 2020), https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/20/legal-black-holes-in-outer-spacethe-regulation-of-private-space-companies/.
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of environmental contamination,249 that the private sector cannot be trusted to
prioritize without some form of regulation in place. One foreshadowing example
is the 1800s Gold Rush Era, which many have compared to the
commercialization of space.250 When miners in the 1800s were given the
opportunity to develop their own set of rules and customs to govern mining
claims, environmental concerns took a backseat to the property interests of
miners,251 resulting in significant environmental damage that was not recognized
until the following century.252
Additionally, it is likely that allowing the private sector to make their own
rules for resource extraction will only extend the existing wealth inequalities on
Earth into outer space.253 Unlike gold mining in the 1800s, space exploration
missions are highly exclusive—the number of private enterprises with the
resources to fulfill these missions confines the players in this industry to a
“narrow, ‘cosmic elite.’”254 While these private companies are fond of discourse
that portrays them as “pioneers” of space who intend to save humanity from
extinction through extraterrestrial colonization,255 the reality is that “commercial
resource extraction serves the exclusive interests of their private shareholders at
the expense of the vast majority of the global population.”256 With language such
as “asteroid trillionaires” being used,257 it is hard to imagine that private
enterprises will have the best interests of humanity in mind.
E. The Soft-Law Approach: Non-Binding Principles Through Multilateral
Forums
A final, middle-ground approach has been offered by scholars and space law
organizations as an alternative to international binding legal instruments: the
development of a bottom-up, soft law instrument through a multilateral forum
such as COPUOS.258 This approach allows for the inclusivity and cooperation
of multilateral discussions without the lengthy negotiation process and concrete

249

See id.
See Shaw, supra note 34, at 122, 125; Pearson, supra note 32.
251
See Shaw, supra note 34, at 143.
252
See id. at 150.
253
See Stockwell, supra note 248.
254
See id.
255
See id.
256
See id.
257
Glester, supra note 3.
258
See Insight–Encouraging the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, supra note 2; Anzaldúa &
Finnigan, supra note 194.
250
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nature of a formal, binding international treaty.259 Proponents of this approach
have urged the United States and other nations to engage in discussions through
COPUOS to develop a set of nonbinding, tightly-focused legal principles on
space resource extraction and utilization.260 While a formal, binding multilateral
treaty is not appropriate for an activity that has not yet taken place (and may not
even be appropriate thereafter), the unilateral, country-by-country adoption of
national laws on the subject is not an appropriate answer either.261 International
coordination and agreement is still necessary in this arena to provide legal
certainty on issues such as property rights and to mitigate the risks involved in
pursuing this type of activity.262
Soft law is typically characterized as a set of nonbinding legal principles that
aim to establish standards and best practices for a particular activity.263 In the
realm of outer space, soft law has often been used as a means to expand on
principles and resolve ambiguities within existing treaties or other hard laws.264
For example, the U.N. Legal Subcommittee has developed several sets of soft
law principles to expand on specific issues that have arisen relating to outer
space, such as the use of nuclear power sources in outer space.265 A common
critique of soft law is that it is typically not legally binding,266 which raises the
concern that countries may agree to a soft law instrument and then violate those
principles in practice, as there is no formal obligation to adhere to them.
However, if designed properly, soft law instruments can create obligations in
two other ways: (1) if adopted by all parties to a binding treaty, soft law
instruments can become an authoritative basis for interpreting the treaty; and (2)
soft law instruments can create procedural obligations by setting forth specific

259

See Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
See Insight–Encouraging the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, supra note 2; Anzaldúa &
Finnigan, supra note 194.
261
See Insight–Encouraging the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, supra note 2 (“For example, one
cannot create a claims system without some level of mutual recognition and protection, be that on a bilateral,
plurilateral, or multilateral basis.”).
262
See id.
263
Jennifer Ann Urban, Soft Law: The Key to Security in a Globalized Outer Space, 43 TRANSP. L.J. 33,
46 (2016).
264
Id.; see Jack M. Beard, Soft Law’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for
Outer Space Activities, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 335, 347 (2017) (“[S]oft law initiatives should be embraced as ‘a
key building block for norm-setting and regulation of the outer space environment.’”).
265
G.A. Res. 47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992) (“[T]he use of nuclear power sources in outer space shall be restricted
to those space missions which cannot be operated by non-nuclear energy sources in a reasonable way.”); see
Urban, supra note 263, at 46–47.
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See Beard, supra note 264, at 348.
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technical standards and guidelines.267 Additionally, well-designed soft law
instruments often lead to the development of binding, coordinated domestic
legislation and international agreements.268
In an area such as space law, in which the technology is rapidly evolving,
this type of soft law instrument can be beneficial in creating specialized
standards and practices for space resource extraction without having to go
through the long and arduous treaty-making process.269 As mentioned above,
treaties sometimes take decades to come into effect.270 This runs the risk that in
the time it takes for a new treaty to be negotiated and agreed upon, new
technologies or issues may arise within the realm of space resource extraction
that could not have been foreseen at the time negotiations began. A soft law
instrument would allow for space resource extraction principles to mold to needs
as they arise and evolve alongside the industry.271 As expressed previously in
this Part, the actual extraction of natural resources from a celestial body has not
yet taken place, but once it becomes evident what form such practices will take,
these soft law principles may then serve as a basis for a binding hard law, if
feasible. Soft law is a “long established, vital component of the space law
regime” and the international community has come to increasingly rely on its
flexibility.272 Therefore, soft law is an ideal starting point for developing norms
and procedures for space resource extraction.
One model for this type of soft law instrument is the most recent success that
came out of COPUOS in 2019: the Guidelines for Long-Term Sustainability of
Outer Space Activities (“Guidelines”).273 These Guidelines represent “a
collection of internationally recognized measures for ensuring the long-term
267
Id. at 348–49. One example of this is the non-binding recommendations put forth by the International
Telecommunications Union for the regulation of satellites. Id. at 349. If governments fail to comply with these
regulations, they risk being isolated from the telecommunications industry due to “non-matching standards or
outdated equipment.” Id. at 350.
268
Id. at 350–52. For example, many nonbinding principles from the U.N. General Assembly Resolution
on “Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space” have been incorporated into legally
binding domestic licensing regulations of numerous countries. Id. at 350.
269
See Urban, supra note 263, at 47–48.
270
See supra Part III.B.
271
See Urban, supra note 263, at 49. As globalization of space occurs, the interests of future space actors
are likely to change. Id. One example of this is the rise of the private sector to the forefront of the space
technology industry.
272
Beard, supra note 264, at 352.
273
Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., https://www.
unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/long-term-sustainability-of-outer-space-activities.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2022) (“The Guidelines provide guidance on the policy and regulatory framework for space activities; safety of
space operations; international cooperation, capacity-building and awareness; and scientific and technical
research and development.”); see Insight–Encouraging the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, supra note 2.
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sustainability of outer space activities and for enhancing the safety of space
operations.”274 The purpose of these Guidelines is to provide a policy and
regulatory framework for space activities, focusing on international cooperation,
the safety of space operations, and scientific research and development.275 While
these Guidelines are not binding, they were adopted by an absolute consensus of
all ninety-two member nations of COPUOS at the time,276 and the committee
urges its members to “voluntarily take measures to ensure that the guidelines are
implemented to the greatest extent feasible and practicable.”277 In developing
these Guidelines, COPUOS first established a Working Group on the LongTerm Sustainability of Outer Space Activities in 2010. The group was comprised
of experts in outer space sustainability and was tasked with identifying areas of
concern in long-term space activities, proposing measures to enhance
sustainability, and drafting the Guidelines.278 The first set of Guidelines were
agreed upon in 2016 and the final Guidelines were officially adopted in 2019.279
A starting point in applying this type of multilateral coordination effort to
space resource extraction and utilization is the Building Blocks for the
Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities,
published by The Hague International Space Resources Working Governance
Group in November 2019.280 The group, which represents a wide range of
viewpoints, consists of more than thirty members of academia, government, and
industry and is tasked with the common goal of creating a structured legal
environment for space resource activities.281 The purpose of the Building Blocks
is to serve as the basis for a potential future international agreement.282 The
Building Blocks contain a number of principles that the Hague group views as

274
Peter Martinez, The U.N. COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space
Activities, SECURE WORLD FOUND. (Nov. 2019), https://swfound.org/media/206891/swf_un_copuos_lts_
guidelines_fact_sheet_november-2019-1.pdf.
275
Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, supra note 273.
276
Martinez, supra note 274.
277
Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, supra note 273.
278
Id.; see Martinez, supra note 274.
279
Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, supra note 273.
280
THE HAGUE INT’L SPACE RES. GOVERNANCE WORKING GRP., BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK ON SPACE RESOURCE ACTIVITIES 1 (2019). The Hague
International Space Resources Working Governance Group is organized through the International Institute of
Air and Space Law, a reputable international academic research institute within Leiden University in the
Netherlands.
International
Institute
of
Air
and
Space
Law,
UNIVERSITEIT
LEIDEN,
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/law/institute-of-public-law/institute-of-air-space-law (last visited Feb. 2,
2022).
281
Id.; see Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
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THE HAGUE INT’L SPACE RES. GOVERNANCE WORKING GRP., supra note 280; see Christensen &
Johnson, supra note 147.
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“necessary to enable space resources utilization in a manner consistent with
international law and providing industry legal certainty,”283 with an emphasis on
establishing rights to resources, technical and safety standards, and addressing
environmental risks.284 These principles may act as a reference point for any
future multilateral discussions that take place through COPUOS.
A soft law instrument would allow the United States to benefit from the
cooperation of a multilateral forum without the lengthy negotiation period
associated with the treaty-making process. Pursuing this approach does not mean
the United States has to abandon the Artemis Accords and its negotiations with
other nations. As NASA representatives have said, the Artemis Accords are only
a small, modest step forward in developing a regime for resource extraction in
space.285 A multilateral discussion through COPUOS can take place at the same
time as the United States’ bilateral negotiations through the Artemis program—
the former will simply take a more focused, prescriptive approach to the
extraction of natural resources in space and associated property rights, a concept
which the Artemis Accords skirt around.286
III. APPLYING PRINCIPLES FROM EXISTING MINING LAWS TO A
SOFT LAW APPROACH
Ultimately, the most efficient and appropriate method for developing an
internationally recognized framework for the extraction and utilization of space
resources is the development of soft law principles through an international
forum. This approach allows countries to develop a set of evolving principles
for best practices in space resource extraction that accounts for the needs of a
rapidly changing industry while avoiding the lengthy treaty negotiation process.
Thus, a final question remains: which principles should be included in such an
approach? The best way to answer this question is by looking at both the
successes and failures of existing mining laws on Earth. This Part examines the
various principles of the terrestrial mining laws discussed in Part I.A and applies
those principles to the concept of space resource extraction in a soft law context.

283

Christensen & Johnson, supra note 147.
THE HAGUE INT’L SPACE RES. GOVERNANCE WORKING GRP., supra note 280, at 3–4 (arts. 8, 10(a),
11.1-11.2).
285
Panel at the University of Nebraska Space Law Week Conference, supra note 28, at 5:39–5:45 (remarks
by Mike Gold, Acting Assoc. Adm’r, Off. of Int’l and Interagency Affs.).
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Id. at 33:05–33:19.
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A. Principles from the 1872 Mining Law
One of the most important aspects of the 1872 Mining Law was the ability
for miners to obtain a patent for the land on which they discovered valuable
minerals and thus obtain fee simple title to the land and its resources.287 The
realm of outer space, however, is different from that of the Wild West: while the
U.S. government’s priority under the 1872 Mining Law was to settle and develop
the West,288 the potential settling of outer space has been a primary point of
contention among nations.289 Most proposed frameworks, including the Artemis
Accords and the Hague Building Blocks, emphasize compliance with existing
international space law.290 The Outer Space Treaty explicitly prohibits the
national appropriation of outer space,291 and a common concern raised in
arguments against the extraction of resources is that it may lead to the
colonization of space.292 Therefore, any set of soft law principles for the use of
space resources must address the extent of property rights in space.
Because most countries have agreed that any framework for space resource
extraction must comply with the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits national
appropriation of space,293 claims over space resources extracted by private
entities should resemble an unpatented claim under the 1872 Mining Law.294
This would grant private entities exclusive possession over any space resources
and minerals extracted in addition to surface rights for the purpose of mining
activities only. While the patent moratorium under the 1872 Mining Law
essentially eliminated the incentive component of the law and thus diminished
its success,295 the same concern does not apply to outer space. An “unpatented”
claim to space resources would still provide incentive to private entities to
287

LAITOS, supra note 41, at 472–73.
Shaw, supra note 34, at 147.
289
Ji et al., supra note 29.
290
See THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 21, § 10(2) (“[T]he extraction and utilization of space
resources, including any recovery from the surface or subsurface of the Moon, Mars, comets, or asteroids, should
be executed in a manner that complies with the Outer Space Treaty . . . .”); THE HAGUE INT’L SPACE RES.
GOVERNANCE WORKING GRP., supra note 280, at 3 (art. 8.3) (“The international framework should ensure that
the utilization of space resources is carried out in accordance with the principle of non-appropriation under
Article II OST.”).
291
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 14, art. II.
292
Cheney, supra note 29 (describing arguments raised by Belgium and Russia, in response to the U.S.
Space Competitiveness Act of 2015, that space resources are equivalent to celestial bodies and therefore may
not be appropriated by extension of national jurisdiction under the Outer Space Treaty).
293
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 14, art. II.
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LAITOS, supra note 41, at 494.
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See Shaw, supra note 34, at 146–47 n.133.
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engage in space exploration and resource extraction because the value lies
primarily in the space minerals themselves, rather than the surface rights to the
land.296
B. Principles from Deep-Sea Mining Laws
As discussed in Part I.A.2, UNCLOS was never ratified by the United States
due to its use of the “common heritage of mankind” principle, which prohibits
states from claiming sovereignty over the deep seabed and its resources.297 The
United States instead chose to adopt the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources
Act (DSHMRA), a multilateral agreement that sets forth criteria that the United
States considers necessary to an acceptable international deep sea mining
regime, including access for U.S. citizens to deep-seabed mineral resources and
assurance that any mining activities that U.S. citizens engage in prior to the
signing of any international regime will be allowed to continue.298 Therefore,
these same principles must be included in any set of soft law principles for space
resource extraction and utilization to avoid a failure similar to the United States’
refusal to sign UNCLOS.299
Another failure of UNCLOS that should be avoided in this context is the
establishment of the International Seabed Authority to regulate and control deepseabed mining activities.300 As discussed in Part II.B, the process took nearly
thirty years to come into force and no commercial mining of the deep seabed has
yet taken place under the ISA’s regulation.301 Additionally, the ISA requires
mining applicants to pay a hefty royalty payment and also requires the sharing
of mining revenues among nations.302 This is contrary to the U.S. view of natural
resources as a “common property right”303 and eliminates any incentive for
private enterprises to engage in space exploration. Incentives were part of the
success of the 1872 Mining Law, which required no royalty payments or sharing
of revenues.304 An alternative concept included in UNCLOS that should be
applied to a framework for outer space mining is the concept of “due regard” for
the interests of other nations.305 UNCLOS acknowledges the freedom of the high
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305

See Glester, supra note 3, at 34–35; Wong, supra note 4.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, arts. 136–37.
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, supra note 68.
See supra Part I.A.2.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, arts. 156–57.
Anzaldúa & Finnigan, supra note 194.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, annex III, art. 3.
Anderson et al., supra note 65, at 255.
Shaw, supra note 34, at 149.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, art. 87.
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seas to all nations, but states that “[t]hese freedoms shall be exercised by all
States with due regard for the interests of other States.”306 A similar concept has
been proposed in the Hague Building Blocks, stating that “[t]he international
framework should provide that States and international organizations
responsible for space resource activities shall give due regard to the
corresponding interests of all countries and humankind.”307 This “soft” approach
to the idea of sharing space and its resources allows for cooperation among
nations and the recognition of other nations’ interests without hindering the
private incentive to explore and utilize space.
C. Principles from the Antarctic Treaty System
The Antarctic Treaty System emphasizes scientific research and exploration,
and centers around an overall concept of the peaceful use of Antarctica and its
resources.308 Thus, there are many relevant principles from the Antarctic Treaty
System that can and should be applied to a soft law framework for space resource
extraction. For instance, Articles II and III of the Antarctic Treaty provide for
the freedom of scientific investigation and the exchange of information and
encourage cooperation among nations with a scientific interest in Antarctica.309
Similar principles have been proposed in both the Artemis Accords and the
Hague Building Blocks.310 For example, Section 8 of the Artemis Accords reads,
“The Signatories are committed to the open sharing of scientific data . . . [and]
plan to make the scientific results obtained from cooperative activities under
these Accords available to the public and the international scientific community,
as appropriate, in a timely manner.”311 This same section, however, makes it
clear that this obligation does not apply to private sector operations.312
Therefore, any set of soft law principles on space resource extraction will need
to clearly differentiate between the rights and obligations of sovereign states and
private enterprises.
Another concept from the Antarctic Treaty System that may be successful if
applied to outer space is its two-tier regulatory structure,313 as opposed to the

306

Id.
THE HAGUE INT’L SPACE RES. GOVERNANCE WORKING GRP., supra note 280, at 3 (art. 9).
308
The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
309
The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 38, arts. II, III, XI.
310
See THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 21, § 8; THE HAGUE INT’L SPACE RES. GOVERNANCE
WORKING GRP., supra note 280, at 5 (sec. 14).
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THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 21, § 8.
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See Skauge, supra note 61, at 827.
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single governing body implemented by UNCLOS (the ISA).314 As discussed in
Part I.A.3, the Antarctic Treaty System divides member nations into
“consultative” and “non-consultative” parties.315 Consultative parties are those
nations that have contributed to substantial research activities in Antarctica and
have decision-making authority, while non-consultative parties may attend only
as observers.316 This model allows industrialized countries, which have the most
stake in the scientific exploration of Antarctica, to have primary authority in
decision-making while also allowing developing nations to participate.317
Applied to space mining, this system could allow developing nations to
participate in the expanding space economy while avoiding the wealth sharing
mechanisms, as used in UNCLOS, that the United States typically opposes.318
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE RESOURCE EXTRACTION
If a soft law instrument establishing principles for space resource extraction
is agreed upon and the practice goes into effect, there will necessarily be policy
implications, particularly with respect to environmental considerations. A
common argument made by advocates for space resource extraction is that
mining in space is the solution to the depletion of natural resources on Earth.319
These proponents point to scientific evidence that many key natural resources,
such as the rare earth metals used in renewable energy production, are becoming
increasingly scarce.320 They argue that mining for these resources in space is not
only beneficial but also essential to preserve the environment on Earth.321
Scientists project that asteroids contain millions of tons of such resources,
including gold, cobalt, iron, and platinum, and that there are at least one million
asteroids with the potential to be mined.322 Additionally, asteroids and other
celestial bodies contain elements that are particularly scarce on Earth; one such
element is Helium-3, which may “be used as a low-cost, efficient energy source”
with relatively little pollutive effect.323
On the other side of the environmental argument, however, are scholars that
caution against treating outer space as an unlimited source of natural resources
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, arts. 156–57.
TRONCHETTI, supra note 82, at 139, 150.
The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 38, art. IX; see TRONCHETTI, supra note 82, at 139.
See Skauge, supra note 61, at 821.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 38, annex III, art. 3.
Doshi, supra note 103, at 197.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 198–99.
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with no environmental consequences.324 As Alex Gilbert, a fellow in the
Colorado School of Mines Space Resource Program, has pointed out, this is
precisely the view that led to overexploitation of the West during the 1800s Gold
Rush.325 Gilbert argues that environmental protection and sustainability values
must be expanded to cover the extraterrestrial environment and that these values
must be at the forefront of any efforts to pursue space resource extraction.326 If
plans to mine space resources are successful, an entirely new set of
environmental concerns outside the realm of those on Earth will arise, as the
extraterrestrial environment is particularly fragile due to its low-gravity nature
and issues such as how to manage space debris will need to be addressed.327
Another aspect of the environmental debate is the impact that rocket
launches and other space exploration ventures may have on Earth’s
atmosphere.328 Rocket launches expel billions of particles into the air, including
soot and carbon dioxide, both of which have a negative impact on air quality and
“contribut[e] to global climate change.”329 On the one hand, while “[s]pace
launch emissions are not a significant contributor to greenhouse gases
currently,” increasing space exploration missions and introducing new rocket
models may have a larger effect on the environment in the future.330 On the other
hand, recent scientific studies have estimated that the environmental impact on
Earth of mining rare metals in outer space, which takes into account the launch
and re-entry of spacecrafts, would be exponentially smaller than the impact of
mining the same metal on Earth.331 Scientists anticipate that extraterrestrial
mining could have significant environmental benefits on Earth by relocating
certain terrestrial mining activities to space.332 Additionally, the environmental

324
Resources Radio, Space Resources: Exploring the Final Frontier, with Alex Gilbert, RES. MAG.
(Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.resourcesmag.org/resources-radio/space-resources-exploring-final-frontier-alexgilbert/.
325
Id. (comparing the argument that space resources are virtually unlimited to those arguments used in the
past during the settling of the West).
326
Id. Gilbert also points to an open legal question: whether the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) applies to outer space, a question that warrants its own Comment. Id.
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See Hunter Sutherland, The Stakes Are Out of this World: How to Fix the Space Act of 2015, 22 VT. J.
ENV’T L. 100, 109 (2021).
329
See Erin C. Bennett, To Infinity and Beyond: The Future Legal Regime Governing Near-Earth Asteroid
Mining, 48 TEX. ENV’T L.J. 81, 93 (2018).
330
Id. at 94–95.
331
See Andreas M. Hein, Hortense Tollu & Michael Saidani, Exploring Potential Environmental Benefits
of Asteroid Mining, at 4 (2001) (69th Int’l Astronautical Cong., IAC-18-D4.5.11, 2018).
332
Id. at 1.
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impact of rocket launches could be reduced by the use of “green propellants”
and other eco-design principles.333
Ultimately, if private actors or governments find a way to tap into these
extraterrestrial resources, there will be vast implications for the environment,
both on Earth and in space. These implications will likely lead to policy debates
over which environment to prioritize—our native environment on Earth or the
extraterrestrial environment that may hold the key to our future. While this
existential question could be debated endlessly, it is important to recognize that
both sides of the argument exist and must be addressed in any future space
resource regime, whether developed through soft or hard law.
CONCLUSION
The eventual attempt by private enterprises and governments to extract and
utilize space resources is inevitable. With lofty claims being made by space
experts as to the value of minerals on asteroids and the moon, as well as the
rapidly advancing technology in the space exploration industry,334 private
companies are likely to pursue space mining activities as soon as it is financially
feasible, whether there is a legal system in place or not. For this reason, it is
crucial to get ahead of the industry and begin serious international conversations
about the issues and rights surrounding space resource extraction, and quickly.
While the Artemis Accords are a step in the right direction, the best way to
ensure a common understanding as to the future of space resources is through a
set of carefully designed soft law principles that specifically address space
resource extraction through an international, multilateral forum.
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